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ABSTRACT: This paper defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason 
problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and 
bring about certain attitudes but not reasons for those attitudes. The argument turns on the transmission 
of reasons: the familiar fact that there is often reason for one action or attitude because there is reason for 
another. I argue that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in a different way to the right kind of 
reasons, and that this fact is best explained by the skeptical view. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Fitting-attitudes accounts of value (FA accounts) hold, to a first approximation, that the 
valuable is what there is sufficient reason to value. Accounts of this form look especially 
plausible when applied to certain specific value properties. For example, each of the 
following analyses looks highly compelling: 
 
 For x to be admirable is for there to be sufficient reason to admire x. 
 For x to be enviable is for there to be sufficient reason to envy x. 
 For x to be amusing is for there to be sufficient reason to be amused by x. 
 
These analyses are plausible because the admirable, the enviable, and the amusing are each 
conceptually connected to an attitude or reaction of a certain sort. But the connection is not a 
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merely descriptive one – it is not that the admirable is what is actually admired, for instance. 
Rather, the connection is normative – the admirable is what worth admiring, or fitting to 
admire, or correct to admire. And if we understand this normative connection in terms of 
reasons – if we say that what is worthy, fitting, or correct is what there is sufficient reason for 
– then we reach the above analyses. By the same route, we reach parallel accounts of many 
other (dis)value properties, including the awesome, the scary, the blameworthy, the 
contemptible, the choiceworthy, the credible, and so on.1 
However, FA accounts face a famous problem – the wrong kind of reason problem 
(WKR problem). The problem arises because it can seem that reasons to value something do 
not always bear on the object’s value. Suppose, for example, that an evil demon will kill you 
unless you admire him. Then, we might want to say, you ought to admire the demon, 
although he is not admirable. Or suppose, for a more realistic example, that envying your 
colleague’s recent promotion will be detrimental to your working relationship, and so to your 
own chances of promotion. Then, perhaps, you ought not envy your colleague. But this does 
not by itself show that your colleague’s promotion is not enviable.2 FA accounts thus look 
subject to counter-example. 
The WKR problem has a schematic solution. According to this solution, we need to 
distinguish between two kinds of reasons for attitudes. The right kind of reasons to value are 
considerations which are both reasons to value an object and features that make it valuable. 
The wrong kind of reasons are considerations which are reasons to value an object but not 
features that make it valuable. For example, the fact that Angie gives up so much of her time 
                                                
1 Cf. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, ‘Sentiment and Value’, Ethics 110 (2000): 722-48, 747 and Mark 
Schroeder, ‘Value and the Right Kind of Reason’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5, ed. Russ Shafer-
Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 25-55, 26-7. 
2 The first of these examples is from Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rassmussen, ‘The Strike of the 
Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value’, Ethics 114 (2004): 391-423, the second is from Justin D’Arms 
and Daniel Jacobson, ‘The Moralistic Fallacy: On the “Appropriateness” of Emotions’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90. For further examples and discussion, see the works cited in note 
3. 
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to charity work is both a reason to admire her and something that makes her admirable. By 
contrast, the fact that the demon will kill you unless you admire him is a reason to admire the 
demon but not a feature that makes him admirable. The task for FA analyses is to draw this 
distinction in an informative way, and without presupposing notions of value. If this task can 
be completed, FA analyses can be revised: we can say that the valuable is what there is 
sufficient reason of the right kind to value.3 
As many have noted, the distinction FA accounts require here seems to be of a kind 
with the familiar distinctions between evidential and pragmatic reasons for belief, and 
between reasons to intend which depend on reasons to act and reasons to intend which 
depend on further benefits of intending. The former distinction is famously illustrated by 
Pascal’s wager. According to Pascal, the expected utility of believing in God is a reason to 
believe in God, although it is not evidence that God exists. The latter distinction is well-
illustrated by Kavka’s toxin puzzle.4 Kavka imagined an eccentric billionaire offering you a 
$1m prize for intending today to drink an unpleasant toxin at noon tomorrow. Here there 
appears to be a reason to intend to drink the toxin, but – since you win the money whether or 
not you go on to drink the toxin – not a reason to drink it. 
It is immediately plausible that the same sort of thing is going on in all of these cases 
– that what we see here are three instances of a general distinction. This immediate reaction 
can be reinforced by observing that there are common marks shared by the contrasting 
reasons in these cases. Most strikingly, there is a difference in the ease and way in which you 
                                                
3 For attempts to carry out this task, see D’Arms and Jacobson ‘Sentiment and Value’ and ‘The Moralistic 
Fallacy’; Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson, ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’, Mind 116 (2007): 511-22; Pamela 
Hieronymi, ‘The Wrong Kind of Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005): 437-57; Jonas Olson, ‘Buck-
Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons’, The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 295-300; Derek Parfit, 
‘Reasons and Rationality’, in Exploring Practical Philosophy, ed. Dan Egonsson, Bjorn Petersson, Jonas 
Joselfsson, and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2001), 17-39; Christian Piller, ‘Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences’, 
Philosophy 59 (2006): 151-81; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rassmussen, ‘The Strike of the Demon’; Schroeder, 
‘Value and the Right Kind of Reason’; Phillip Stratton-Lake, ‘How to Deal with Evil Demons: Comment on 
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rassmussen, Ethics 115 (2005): 788-98.  
4 Gregory Kavka, ‘The Toxin Puzzle’, Analysis 43 (1983): 33-6. 
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can respond to the different reasons. For example, it is hard to see how you could believe in 
God on grounds of expected utility, intend to drink the toxin in order to win $1m, or admire 
the demon on account of his threat. By contrast, believing on account of the evidence, 
intending on the basis of reasons to act, and admiring the admirable, are familiar, if poorly 
understood, phenomena. Moreover, there is a difference in the kind of overall evaluation on 
which the different reasons bear. The incentives in our examples perhaps make it the case 
that you ought to believe in God, intend to drink the toxin, and admire the demon. But they 
do not make these attitudes correct or fitting. It seems to be correct to believe only what is 
true, admire only the admirable, and intend to do only what is worth doing. These shared 
marks strongly suggest a general distinction between two kinds of reasons for attitudes. If this 
is right, an important constraint on solutions to the WKR problem is that evidential reasons to 
believe and ‘act-based’ reasons to intend are counted as being of the right kind. In what 
follows, I thus use the terminology of the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kind of reasons broadly, to 
mark this general distinction, of which the distinction between the two kinds of reason to 
value is an instance. 
This paper defends a very simple solution to the WKR problem, understood in this 
broad way. According to this solution, the right kind of reasons are simply all the reasons 
there are. Strictly speaking, the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes are not reasons for those 
attitudes, any more than fool’s gold is gold. The demon’s threat is not a reason to admire the 
demon, expected utility is not a reason to believe in God, and the $1m prize is not a reason to 
intend to drink the toxin. Rather, the incentives in these cases are reasons to want these 
attitudes, and to bring it about that you have these attitudes, if you can. More generally, 
incentives for attitudes are not reasons for those attitudes, but are instead reasons to want 
these attitudes, and to bring them about. 
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This view treats incentives for attitudes like admiration, belief, and intention in the 
way it is natural to treat incentives for states for which it is clear that there cannot be reasons. 
Just as a demon might threaten to kill you unless you admire him, a demon might threaten to 
kill you unless you have a headache, or an experience as of a red cube, or unless your hair is 
turquoise. Since headaches, perceptual experiences, and the colour of your hair are not the 
sorts of things there can be reasons for, such threats would not provide reasons for you to 
have a headache, an experience of a red cube, or for your hair to be turquoise. But these 
threats would give you reasons to want these things, and to bring them about. On the view 
defended here, the incentives in wrong kind of reason scenarios should be treated in the same 
way. And when treated in this way, the WKR problem disappears. I call this view WKR 
skepticism. 
WKR skepticism is not new. It has been suggested by Alan Gibbard, Derek Parfit, and 
John Skorupski, among others.5 However, many proponents of the WKR problem – WKR 
defenders – find the view unsatisfactory. Thus Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 
complain that ‘Gibbard and Parfit have no argument for their claim, apart from an appeal to 
intuitions we do not share’.6 And Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson agree: 
 
                                                
5 See Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990); Thomas 
Kelly, ‘The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes’, Philosophical Studies 90 (2002): 
163-96; Niko Kolodny, ‘Why be Rational?’, Mind 114 (2005): 509-63; David Owens, Reason without Freedom 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2000); Parfit, ‘Reasons and Rationality’ and On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), chap. 2 and appendix A; Ingmar Persson, ‘Primary and Secondary Reasons’, in Homage à Wlodek: 
Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz,  ed. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Bjorn Petersson, Jonas 
Josefsson and Dan Egonsson, online resource, http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/; Thomas Pink, The 
Psychology of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Nishi Shah, ‘A New Argument for 
Evidentialism’, The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 481-98, and ‘How Action Governs Intention’, 
Philosophers’ Imprint 8 (2008); John Skorupski, The Domain of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). Not all of these authors are committed to WKR skepticism about reasons for all of the attitudes we are 
concerned with here. 
6 ‘The Strike of the Demon’, 412. 
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[i]t is difficult to find an independent rationale for distinguishing in the relevant way between reasons for 
an attitude and reasons to bring it about that we have that attitude…in the demon scenario, the intuition 
that we do have reasons to favour the demon seems at least as strong as any contrary intuition.7 
 
It is perhaps unfair to say that WKR skeptics have offered no argument for their claim. 
Several authors argue for WKR skepticism by appealing to one of the marks of the wrong 
kind of reason noted above – that we seem not to be able to respond to the wrong kind of 
reasons by forming the relevant attitude. These authors argue that we cannot respond to such 
reasons in this way, and that if we cannot respond to some consideration by forming an 
attitude, then that consideration is not a reason for that attitude.  However, while this 
argument has significant appeal, it is it is difficult to get the details straight – to specify a 
notion of ‘responding to a reason’ that will vindicate its two premises.8 So it is worth 
considering whether WKR skepticism might be defended on other grounds. 
 In this paper, I offer a new argument for WKR skepticism – a new way of meeting the 
challenge posed by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, and by Danielsson and Olson. The 
argument I offer turns on the familiar fact that reasons transmit: that there is often reason for 
one action or attitude because there is reason for another. For example, there is often reason 
to do one thing because it is a means to doing something else there is reason to do. And there 
is often reason to believe something because it follows from something else there is reason to 
believe. I shall begin by detailing some of the ways in which reasons transmit, and arguing 
that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in a very different way to reasons of the right 
kind. This difference, I suggest, calls for explanation. We should expect an account of 
                                                
7 ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’, 513-4. 
8 For versions of this argument, see Kelly, ‘The Rationality of Belief’, Kolodny, ‘Why be Rational?’, 547-51, 
Persson, ‘Primary and Secondary Reasons’, and Shah, ‘A New Argument for Evidentialism’. For discussion and 
some worries, see Hieronymi, ‘The Wrong Kind of Reason’, Jennie Louise, ‘Correct Responses and the Priority 
of the Normative’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2009): 345-64, and Andrew Reisner, ‘The Possibility 
of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, Philosophical Studies 145 (2009): 
257-72. 
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reasons of the wrong kind to explain the way in which such reasons behave. The central 
argument of this paper is that WKR skeptics succeed in meeting this challenge, and WKR 
defenders fail. In section three, I argue that WKR skeptics can explain why putative reasons 
of the wrong kind transmit in the way that they do, by appealing to the ways in which reasons 
to want and bring about attitudes transmit. In section four, I consider two strategies by which 
WKR defenders might try to explain the way in which reasons of the wrong kind transmit. I 
argue that both these strategies fail, unless they are supplemented with a further thesis. But 
this further thesis, I argue, is false. WKR defenders are thus left without a way to explain the 
transmission of the wrong kind of reasons. I conclude that the difference in the ways in which 
reasons of the right and wrong kind transmit provides important support for WKR 
skepticism. 
 
2. Transmission Patterns 
 
It will be helpful to begin by looking in some detail at the way in which reasons for action 
transmit from ends to means.  
Suppose that there are reasons for you to visit some friends in another part of the 
world – for example, in California. Because of this, there are reasons for you to take means to 
going to California – to book a ticket, travel to the airport, board the plane, and so forth. 
There are also reasons for you to ensure that certain enabling conditions of your going to 
California are fulfilled – you might need to organize time off work, or renew your passport. 
In other cases, there are reasons to take so called ‘constitutive means’ – reasons to swim as a 
way of exercising, or to go to the concert as a way of having a pleasant evening. Following 
Joseph Raz, I will say that any action that helps you to achieve an end (in one of these ways, 
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or perhaps others) facilitates that end.9 The examples suggest that we can say that reasons for 
action transmit in the following way: 
 
(Action Pattern) If there is a reason to A, then the fact that B-ing facilitates A-ing is a 
reason to B.  
 
Several points of clarification and qualification are in order.10 
 First, the Action Pattern says not merely that there is a reason to B, when B-ing 
facilitates A-ing; it says that the fact that B-ing facilitates A-ing is a reason to B. This gives 
us a weak sense in which there is a reason to B because there is a reason to A. Specifying the 
reason in this way will also make it easier to assess some of the claims about reasons made 
below. 
 Second, some may think that the fact that B-ing facilitates A-ing cannot itself be a 
reason to B, even when there is reason to A. Rather, the reasons to B, fully spelled out, will 
be the facts that constitute reasons to A, in conjunction with the fact that B-ing facilitates A-
ing. Readers of this view will prefer to formulate the Action Pattern as follows: if R is a 
reason to A, then the fact that R and that B-ing facilitates A-ing is a reason to B. I believe that 
nothing in what follows turns on the difference between this formulation and that above. 
However, for brevity I will stick with the original formulation. 
 Third, if you are certain not to achieve the end, whether or not you take the means, we 
might doubt that the end provides any reason to take the means. If you have resolved not to 
go to California, even if you have a ticket, we may want to deny that the fact that buying a 
ticket could help you get to California is a reason to buy a ticket. We can account for this by 
                                                
9 Joseph Raz, ‘The Myth of Instrumental Rationality’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2005): 1-28. 
10 Note also that a more precise version of the Action Pattern would include variables for the agent, and the 
times at which the reason applies, and at which A-ing is to be done. For brevity, I ignore these details 
throughout.   
 9 
stipulation: we will say that B-ing facilitates A-ing only if there is some chance that you will 
A, conditional on B-ing.11 
 Fourth, if you are certain to achieve the end, whether or not you take a certain means, 
we might also doubt that the end provides any reason for this means. Thus if you already 
have a ticket for California, the fact that buying a further ticket could also help you get to 
California seems to be no reason at all to buy another ticket. We can account for this by 
further specification: it is only if B-ing non-superfluously facilitates A-ing, that reasons to A 
transmit to reasons to B.12 
 Fifth, the Action Pattern makes no claim about the weight of reasons. A natural 
suggestion, following Mark Schroeder and Niko Kolodny, is to say that how much reason is 
transmitted from A to B is proportional to how well B-ing facilitates A-ing.13 However, 
nothing in what follows turns on the weight of reasons, so I leave the issue open.14 
                                                
11 See Niko Kolodny, ‘Instrumental Reasons’ (unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 
2011). I leave the relevant notion of probability open. The reader will notice that the relation of facilitation 
across which reasons for action transmit is very weak. For some reasons to think the relevant relation needs to 
be very weak, see Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 112-3 and 
Kolodny, ‘Instrumental Reasons’. 
12 Kolodny, ‘Instrumental Reasons’. 
13 Mark Schroeder, ‘Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons’, Philosophical Studies 43 
(2009): 223-48, 246. 
14 The Action Pattern raises two further issues which I leave open. First, the pattern may seem to have 
implausible consequences in cases of objectionable means. Suppose, for example, that you have a reason to get 
the job, and that secretly assassinating your rival facilitates your doing so. The Action Pattern implies that this 
latter fact is a reason to assassinate your rival. Some will find this objectionable (cf. John Broome, ‘Have We 
Reason To Do As Rationality Requires? A Comment on Raz’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 
(2005): 1-9, 7). A reasonable response, it seems to me, is to accept the implication, but deny that it is 
objectionable. It sounds implausible to say that there is a reason to assassinate your rival only because assertions 
of this form carry a pragmatic implication that this reason is relatively weighty (cf. Donald Hubin, ‘What’s 
Special About Humeanism,” Noûs, 33 (1999): 30-45, 34; Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 92-97; and 
Kolodny, ‘Instrumental Reasons’). However, those not convinced by this response may prefer to qualify the 
Action Pattern so as to avoid counter-examples of this sort. 
 Second, the Action Pattern faces what Matthew Bedke calls the ‘problem of subversion’ (‘The Iffiest 
Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End-Given Conditionals’, Ethics 119 (2009): 672-98, n.12). Suppose, 
to borrow an example from Ryan Millsap, that you have reason to play tennis, and that buying tennis balls 
facilitates playing tennis. The Action Pattern implies that this fact is a reason to buy tennis balls. But if selling 
your tennis racket facilitates buying tennis balls, then the Action Pattern also implies that this fact is a reason to 
sell your tennis racket. And assuming you need your tennis racket to play tennis, this seems pretty implausible. 
This problem deserves more attention than I can give it here – see Bedke, ‘The Iffiest Oughts’, n.12, Kolodny, 
‘Instrumental Reasons’, and Millsap, ‘Practical Reasons and Means-End Transmission’ (PhD Dissertation, 
University of Maryland, in progress) for discussion. One point to note is that the problem does not arise for a 
version of the Action Pattern restricted to necessary facilitative steps. Much of the discussion to follow could be 
framed in these terms.  
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 With the Action Pattern in hand, we can make our first claim about transmission for 
the right kind of reasons. Since the right kind of reasons to intend depend on reasons to act, 
we should expect the right kind of reasons to intend to exhibit a pattern corresponding to the 
Action Pattern. And that is what we find: when there are reasons of the right kind to intend to 
go to California, the fact that booking a ticket facilitates going to California is a reason of the 
right kind to intend to book a ticket, the fact that renewing your passport facilitates going to 
California is a reason of the right kind to intend to renew your passport, and so on. Thus, and 
subject to the same qualifications as the Action Pattern15, we can say that: 
 
(Intention Pattern) If there is a reason of the right kind to intend to A, then the fact that B-
ing facilitates A-ing is a reason of the right kind to intend to B. 
 
Consider now the right kind of reasons to desire. Such reasons transmit in a similar way to 
reasons to intend. If there are reasons of the right kind to want the conference you are 
attending next week to go well, there are reasons of the right kind to want things that will 
help to bring this about, or which are conditions of its doing so – the fact that good papers, 
good weather, and good conversation will help the conference to go well is a reason to want 
good papers, good weather, and good conversation. The right kind of reasons to desire 
transmit across facilitative connections between the objects of desire:  
 
 (Desire Pattern) If there is a reason of the right kind for you to desire x to F, then the 
fact that y’s G-ing facilitates x’s F-ing is a reason of the right kind for 
you to desire y to G.16 
                                                
15 The Intention Pattern is also subject to a further qualification: if intending to B does not facilitate B-ing, 
reasons to B do not provide reasons to intend to B. 
16 The greater complexity in this formulation is required to cover the case in which, for example, there is a 
reason to want the sun to shine because the sun’s shining facilitates your garden’s growing. 
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We can now turn to putative reasons of the wrong kind. The first thing to note is that the 
wrong kind of reasons do not transmit in the way that the right kind of reasons do – the 
patterns we get by replacing ‘right’ with ‘wrong’ in the Intention and Desire Patterns are 
false. To see this, suppose that in the toxin puzzle, going to the billionaire’s mansion for noon 
the next day facilitates drinking the toxin. The Intention Pattern, with ‘right’ replaced by 
‘wrong’, tells us that this fact is a reason of the wrong kind to intend to go to the billionaire’s 
mansion. But although this fact might be a reason of the right kind to intend to go to the 
billionaire’s mansion – if, for instance, there is any reason at all to drink the toxin – it is not a 
reason of the wrong kind for this intention. Similarly, if an evil demon threatens to kill you 
unless you desire a saucer of mud, then the fact that acquiring a saucer and heading out into 
the garden facilitates getting a saucer of mud might be a reason of the right kind to want to do 
this – if there is anything desirable about having a saucer of mud – but it is not a reason of the 
wrong kind for this desire.  
However, putative reasons of the wrong kind do transmit in other ways. Here are two 
examples. First, if you believed, in the toxin puzzle, that you ought to drink the toxin, then 
you could form the intention to drink the toxin on that basis. (You could simply reason, ‘I 
ought to drink the toxin, so I’ll drink the toxin’, thereby forming the intention to do so). In 
this way, believing that you ought to drink the toxin would help you to form the intention to 
drink the toxin, and so help you to win the $1m. That looks like a reason to believe that you 
ought to drink the toxin. However, it is not evidence that you ought to drink the toxin. Rather, 
it is a way in which it would be good to believe that you ought to drink the toxin. It is a 
reason of the wrong kind for this belief. 
Second, suppose that you believe that going to the billionaire’s mansion is necessary 
for drinking the toxin. If you are rational, you will find it difficult to intend to drink the toxin 
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unless you also intend to go to the billionaire’s mansion – for if you are rational, you will 
intend what you take to be the necessary means to your intended ends. In this way, intending 
to go to the billionaire’s mansion would help you to intend to drink the toxin, and so win the 
$1m. That looks like a way in which it would be good to intend to go to the billionaire’s 
mansion, and so a reason of the wrong kind for this intention.  
 In the first of these examples, the belief that you ought to drink the toxin is a means to 
intending to drink the toxin. In the second, the intention to go to the billionaire’s mansion is 
an enabling condition. So what the examples suggest is that putative reasons of the wrong 
kind transmit across facilitative connections between attitudes – that when one attitude 
facilitates an attitude for which there is the wrong kind of reason, the fact that it does so is a 
reason of the wrong kind for that attitude. Again, this claim needs to be qualified in various 
ways. For example, if you have just taken an “intention pill”, which will ensure that at 
midnight tonight you will intend to drink the toxin, then the belief that you ought to drink the 
toxin is superfluous. So in this version of the case, there is no benefit to, and so no reason of 
the wrong kind of reason for, this belief. For another example, if you are unable to sustain an 
intention to drink the toxin even if you intend to go to the billionaire’s mansion, then forming 
this latter intention is pointless in a different way – in the sense of ‘facilitates’ stipulated 
earlier, it does not facilitate the intention to drink the toxin. So in this case too, there is no 
benefit to, and so no reason of the wrong kind for, this intention.  
 Keeping these qualifications in mind however – and noting in passing that they 
parallel the qualifications made to the Action Pattern – the examples nonetheless suggest that 
putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in the following way: 
 
(Wrong Reason Pattern) If there is a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A, 
then the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a 
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reason of the wrong kind for attitude B. 
 
I now want to suggest that this pattern is distinctive of the wrong kind of reasons for 
attitudes. No parallel pattern holds for the right kind of reasons, or for reasons for attitudes in 
general. 
 Consider first the pattern we get by replacing both occurrences of ‘wrong’ with 
‘right’: 
 
(Right Reason Pattern) If there is a reason of the right kind for attitude A, then 
the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a reason 
of the right kind for attitude B.  
 
This pattern clearly does not hold. For example, consider someone who has evidence that p, 
but is disposed to believe that p only if he also believes that q. And suppose that this 
disposition holds not because of any evidential relation between p and q, but because of a 
strange psychological quirk, or because believing that q helps him to cope with the painful 
truth that p. For such a person, believing that q facilitates believing that p. But that fact is not 
an evidential reason to believe that q. The right kind of reasons to desire also illustrate the 
point. Consider someone who has a reason of the right kind to desire to A, but is 
psychologically disposed to desire to A only if she also desires to B. For such a person, 
desiring to B facilitates desiring to A. Again though, that fact is not a reason of the right kind 
to desire to B.17 
 Consider now the: 
 
                                                
17 Cf. Kieran Setiya, ‘Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason’, Ethics 117 (2007): 649-73, 672 and Jonathan 
Way, ‘Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason’, Philosophical Studies 147 (2010): 213-
33, 226-7. 
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(General Pattern) If there is a reason for attitude A, then the fact that attitude B 
facilitates attitude A is a reason of the wrong kind for attitude 
B. 
 
The General Pattern combines two claims. The first is the Wrong Reason Pattern. The second 
is the: 
 
(Mixed Pattern) If there is a reason of the right kind for attitude A, then the fact 
that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a reason of the wrong 
kind for attitude B. 
 
This pattern may seem plausible. For it may seem that it is good to have attitudes there is the 
right kind of reason for. Of course, such attitudes need not be instrumentally good. But such 
attitudes may be thought to be good for their own sake, insofar as they constitute a proper 
response to one’s reasons. If so, then attitudes which facilitate attitudes there is the right kind 
of reason for are instrumentally good, and so attitudes there is the wrong kind of reason for. 
 However, this argument for the Mixed Pattern fails. It may well be good for its own 
sake to have attitudes which constitute a proper response to one’s reasons. But we do not 
properly respond to our reasons by having attitudes there is merely some reason for. We 
properly respond to our reasons only when we have attitudes there is sufficient reason for. So 
the appeal to value of this sort does not support the claim that it is good for its own sake to 
have attitudes there is reason of the right kind for.18 
                                                
18 Even the claim that it is good to have attitudes there is sufficient reason for is controversial. For example, it is 
denied by Joseph Raz (‘Reasons: Practical and Adaptive’, in Reasons for Action, ed. David Sobel and Steven 
Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 43, 47-8) and Ulrike Heuer (‘Beyond Wrong Reasons: 
The Buck-Passing Account of Value’, in New Waves in Metaethics, ed. Michael Brady (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan), 166-84, 177-8), and it is likely that it would be denied by many of the philosophers who hold that 
there is no distinctive value in believing the truth. For some discussion of the final value of conative attitudes, 
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 Furthermore, examples suggest that this claim is false. For example, if Mustard had 
access to the murder weapon, then that is some reason to think he committed the crime. But if 
several others also had access to the murder weapon, and we have no further relevant 
evidence, then there is not sufficient reason to believe that Mustard committed the crime. If 
you nonetheless do believe that Mustard committed the crime, you are not responding 
properly to your reasons, and your belief does not seem to be good for its own sake. Nor does 
it seem good for its own sake to desire what there is merely some reason to desire, when this 
reason is not sufficient.19 
 If it is not necessarily good to have attitudes there is the right kind of reason for, then 
there is not necessarily anything instrumentally good about attitudes which facilitate attitudes 
there is the right kind of reason for. And so there is not necessarily reason of the wrong kind 
for such attitudes. We should therefore reject the Mixed Pattern, and so the General Pattern. 
The Wrong Reason Pattern is a distinctive feature of the wrong kind of reasons. 
 
3. WKR Skepticism and the Wrong Reason Pattern 
 
The ways in which different kinds of reasons transmit should not, I suggest, be taken as 
primitive. When reasons of a certain kind have some distinctive feature, we should expect an 
account of reasons of that kind to explain that feature. Thus we should expect an account of 
the wrong kind of reasons to explain the ways in which such reasons transmit. 
 This task takes slightly different forms for WKR skeptics and WKR defenders. WKR 
defenders must explain why the wrong kind of reasons do in fact transmit in accordance with 
the Wrong Reason Pattern. WKR skeptics, since they deny that there are any reasons of the 
wrong kind, must instead explain why it might appear that the wrong kind of reasons transmit 
                                                                                                                                                  
see Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and my ‘Value and 
Reasons to Favour’ (unpublished manuscript, University of Southampton, 2011). 
19 I defend these claims further in ‘Value and Reasons to Favour’. 
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in this way. They must explain why, if we take reasons to want and bring about attitudes for 
reasons for those attitudes, we will also take the Wrong Reason Pattern to hold. In this 
section, I shall argue that WKR skeptics can meet this challenge, by appealing to the ways in 
which reasons for desire and action transmit. 
The Wrong Reason Pattern is strikingly similar to the Action Pattern. Where the latter 
says that there is reason to do what facilitates actions there is reason to do, the former says 
that there is reason for attitudes which facilitate attitudes there is reason (of the wrong kind) 
to have. In both cases, reasons transmit across facilitative connections between the things for 
which there are reasons.20 
 The connection between the Action and Wrong Reason Pattern becomes clearer still 
when we consider the following near-instance of the Action Pattern: 
 
(Bringing About Pattern):  
 
If there is a reason to bring about attitude A, then the fact that attitude B facilitates 
attitude A is a reason to bring about attitude B. 
 
The Bringing About Pattern is not quite an instance of the Action Pattern. Strictly speaking, 
the Action Pattern only tells us that when there is reason to bring about an attitude A, the fact 
that bringing about attitude B facilitates bringing about attitude A is a reason to bring about 
attitude A. But at least typically, bringing about an attitude B facilitates bringing about 
attitude A only because having attitude B facilitates having attitude A. So it is plausible that 
                                                
20 Of course, the right kind of reasons for intention and desire also transmit across facilitative connections. But 
the facilitative connections in question do not hold between the things for which there are reasons. Rather, they 
hold between the objects of the things for which there are reasons – there is reason to want good papers because 
there is reason to want the conference to go well.  
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when a reason to bring about attitude B is that doing so facilitates bringing about attitude A, 
the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A will also be a reason to bring about attitude B. 
 The Bringing About Pattern is exactly parallel to the Wrong Reason Pattern. We can 
move from the former to the latter by replacing ‘reason to bring about’ with ‘reason of the 
wrong kind for’. So if we take reasons to bring about an attitude to be reasons for that 
attitude, we will take the Wrong Reason Pattern to hold, given that the Bringing About 
Pattern holds. 
 The Wrong Reason Pattern is related to the Desire Pattern in a very similar way. 
Consider the following instance of the Desire Pattern: 
 
(Instance of the Desire Pattern) If there is a reason of the right kind to want attitude A, 
then the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a 
reason of the right kind to want attitude B. 
 
Again, replacing ‘reason of the right kind to want’ with ‘reason of the wrong kind for’ takes 
us from the Instance of the Desire Pattern to the Wrong Reason Pattern. So if we take reasons 
to desire an attitude to be reasons for that attitude, we will take the Wrong Reason Pattern to 
hold, given that the Instance of the Desire Pattern holds. 
 WKR skeptics can thus offer a straightforward explanation of why the Wrong Reason 
Pattern appears to hold. This explanation offers some support for WKR skepticism. But how 
much support it offers depends on whether WKR defenders can adequately explain the 
Wrong Reason Pattern. It is to this question I now turn. 
 
4. WKR Defenders and the Wrong Reason Pattern 
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In this section, I shall consider two strategies by which WKR defenders can try to explain the 
Wrong Reason Pattern. The first looks to WKR defenders’ own accounts of the distinction 
between the right and the wrong kind of reasons. The second considers the possibility of 
analysing the wrong kind of reasons in terms of value. I shall argue that in and of themselves, 
these approaches fail. The first simply fails to offer any explanation of the Wrong Reason 
Pattern. The second seems incompatible with FA accounts of value. However, I shall also 
argue that these strategies are more successful when supplemented with a thesis I call 
Reductionism. Reductionism holds that the wrong kinds of reasons for an attitude are to be 
analysed in terms of the right kind of reasons to want that attitude. Given this thesis, the two 
strategies turn out to be equivalent – and successful. However, I shall argue that 
Reductionism is not a tenable analysis of reasons of the wrong kind. If this is right, WKR 
defenders are left without a satisfactory explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern. 
  
4.1. First Strategy: Appealing to Existing Theories of the Right/Wrong Distinction 
 
It is natural to think that to explain the Wrong Reason Pattern, WKR defenders should look to 
their own accounts of the distinction between the right and wrong kind of reasons. But it 
turns out that this is not an especially promising strategy. To explain the Wrong Reason 
Pattern, WKR defenders need to give an account of what reasons of the wrong kind are, and 
show that it follows from this account that reasons of the wrong kind transmit across 
facilitative connections. But most accounts of the distinction between reasons of the right and 
wrong kind are in no position to do this. Most accounts are primarily theories of the right 
kind of reasons, and tell us little about the wrong kind of reasons. This is not, in itself, a 
problem for such accounts. If the aim is simply to defend a FA account of value, it is 
perfectly legitimate to proceed by telling us what the right kind of reasons are, and then 
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framing your FA account in those terms. However, it does mean that such accounts are in no 
position to show that the wrong kind of reasons transmit across facilitative connections, and 
so offer no explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern. I will illustrate this point by looking at 
some examples. 
 The best-known account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kind of 
reasons is what I will call the ‘object/state’ theory. On this view, the right kind of reasons for 
an attitude depend on properties of the object of the attitude; the wrong kind of reasons 
depend on properties of the attitude itself.21 For example, Angie’s generosity is the right kind 
of reason to admire her, because it depends on a property of Angie – her generosity. But the 
fact that admiring the demon saves your life is the wrong kind of reason to admire him, since 
it depends on a property of the admiring itself – that it will save your life. 
 This view does tell us something about reasons of the wrong kind. But what it tells us 
is not sufficient to explain the Wrong Reason Pattern. To explain the Wrong Reason Pattern, 
proponents of the object/state theory would have to do two things. First, they would have to 
specify the properties which provide state-given reasons. Second, they would have to show 
that these properties transmit across facilitative connections. They would have to show that 
whenever an attitude B facilitates an attitude A, attitude B has state-given reason-providing 
properties if attitude A does. But proponents of the object/state theory have not done the first 
of these things. They have told us that state-given reasons depend on properties of the 
attitude, but they have not told us which such properties are relevant. And so proponents of 
this theory do not tell us enough to show that state-given reason-providing properties transmit 
across facilitative connections. They do not tell us enough to explain the Wrong Reason 
Pattern. 
                                                
21 See Olson, ‘Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons, Parfit, ‘Reasons and Rationality’ and On What 
Matters, Piller ‘Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons’, and Stratton-Lake, ‘How to Deal with Evil 
Demons’. 
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 A similar difficulty faces the ‘Brentano-style’ account offered by Danielsson and 
Olson.22 Danielsson and Olson distinguish the right kind of reasons by appeal to the second 
mark of the right kind of reason noted in section one: that the right kind of reasons bear on 
correctness. Thus Danielsson and Olson tell us that the right kind of reasons are ‘content-
reasons’: reasons that count in favour of an attitude’s correctness.23 Angie’s generosity is the 
right kind of reason to admire her, because it counts in favour of its being correct to admire 
her; the demon’s threat is not a reason to admire him, because it does not count in favour of – 
indeed, it counts against – its being correct to admire him. Danielsson and Olson contrast 
content-reasons with ‘holding-reasons’. To explain the Wrong Reason Pattern, Danielsson 
and Olson would thus need to show that holding-reasons transmit across facilitative 
connections. They would need to show that whenever attitude B facilitates attitude A, the fact 
that it does so is a holding reason for attitude B if there is a holding reason for attitude A.24 
But all that Danielsson and Olson tell us about holding-reasons is that they are “reasons for 
having the attitude”.25 So they do not tell us enough to explain the Wrong Reason Pattern. 
 Other views tell us even less about reasons of the wrong kind. For example, D’Arms 
and Jacobson suggest that the right kind of reasons for an attitude are those that bear on the 
truth of the content of the attitude (they focus on the right kind of reasons for emotion, 
although it is clear that the suggestion can also be applied to reasons for belief, and perhaps 
intention too).26 But although they supply us with a wide-range of examples of reasons of the 
wrong kind, they make no general suggestion about what such reasons are. Similarly, Mark 
                                                
22 ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’. 
23 What Danielsson and Olson actually say is that content-reasons are ‘reasons for the correctness of an attitude’ 
(ibid., 515). It is a little difficult to interpret this. In particular, it is not clear whether they intend the relationship 
between content-reasons and correctness to be explanatory or evidential. I intend my use of ‘counts in favour of’ 
to be neutral between these interpretations.  
24 Things are actually a bit more complicated than this, since Danielsson and Olson’s view is that the wrong 
kind of reasons are a subset of holding-reasons: they are holding-reasons that do not derive from content-
reasons (ibid., 517). 
25 Ibid., 515. Olson and Danielsson go onto offer an analysis of holding-reasons in terms of content-reasons. I 
address this suggestion below. 
26 ‘The Moralistic Fallacy’. 
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Schroeder defends a very interesting account on which the right kind of reasons are those 
shared by every agent engaged in a certain kind of activity (Schroeder understands this notion 
broadly, so as to include things like believing, admiring, and intending).27 But Schroeder’s 
view is also entirely silent about reasons of the wrong kind. On both of these views, reasons 
of the wrong kind are just left to be any reasons that are not of the right kind. Now as I have 
said, this is not by itself a problem for such accounts. But it does mean that these accounts 
cannot tell us whether reasons of the wrong kind transmit across facilitative connections, and 
so can offer no explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern. 
 We have now seen why standard accounts of the distinction between the right and the 
wrong kind of reasons do not, in and of themselves, explain the Wrong Reason Pattern. I 
shall now show that an explanation becomes available if proponents of these accounts adopt a 
further thesis. This further thesis is a generalisation of a claim made explicitly by Danielsson 
and Olson. Having distinguished between content-reasons and holding-reasons, Danielsson 
and Olson go on to suggest that: 
 
[T]he notion of a holding-reason should be analysed in terms of the notion of a content-reason. To say 
that there is a holding reason to have some attitude is to say that there is a content-reason to favour the 
occurrence of this attitude.28 
 
On Danielsson and Olson’s account, holding-reasons are reduced to content-reasons: to have 
a holding-reason for an attitude is to have a content-reason to favour that attitude. The other 
accounts we have considered may make a parallel move. Given an account of the right kind 
of reasons, the wrong kind of reasons may be analysed in terms of the right kind of reasons to 
want: 
                                                
27 ‘Value and the Right Kind of Reason’. 
28 ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’, 518-9. 
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(Reductionism) For p to be a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A is for p to be a 
reason of the right kind to want attitude A. 
 
Reductionists can explain the Wrong Reason Pattern. As we saw in section three, the wrong 
kind of reasons transmit in the same way as the right kind of reasons for higher-order desires. 
Reductionists can hold that this is so because what it is for some consideration to be a reason 
of the wrong kind just is for it to be a reason of the right kind for a higher-order desire. 
 
4.2. Second Strategy: The Value-Based Theory 
 
I now turn to a second strategy by which WKR defenders might try to explain the Wrong 
Reason Pattern. I shall argue that this strategy also fails, unless it is supplemented by 
Reductionism. 
 The wrong kind of reasons for an attitude seem to have something important to do 
with the value of that attitude. When the demon threatens to kill you unless you admire him, 
it would be good to admire the demon, since this would help you to stay alive. When the 
billionaire offers you a $1m to intend to drink the toxin, it would be good to intend to drink 
the toxin, because you would thereby win $1m. More generally, it seems that there is a reason 
of the wrong kind for an attitude just when that attitude would be valuable in some way.29 
 This simple observation suggests that we might give an account of the wrong kind of 
reasons in terms of value. We might claim that: 
 
                                                
29 It might be thought that the wrong kind of reasons have to do specifically with the instrumental, or at least 
non-final, value of an attitude. However, it will be simpler to ignore this complication.  
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(Value-Based Theory) For p to be a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A is for p to 
be a respect in which it is good to have attitude A. 
 
Given the Value-Based Theory, an explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern seems to fall 
into place. When there is a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A, there is some respect in 
which it is good to have attitude A. And when attitude B facilitates attitude A, there is also a 
respect in which it is good to have attitude B – attitude B facilitates attitude A, which it is 
good to have. So by the Value-Based Theory, the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a 
reason of the wrong kind for attitude B. 
 To take an example, when there is the wrong kind of reason to intend to drink the 
toxin, there is a respect in which it is good to intend to drink the toxin. And so if believing 
that you ought to drink the toxin facilitates this intention, there is also a respect in which it is 
good to believe that you ought to drink the toxin – this belief facilitates the intention to drink 
the toxin. So by the Value-Based Theory, the fact that believing that you ought to drink the 
toxin facilitates intending to drink the toxin is a reason of the wrong kind to believe that you 
ought to drink the toxin. 
 The Value-Based Theory thus seems to offer a straightforward explanation of the 
Wrong Reason Pattern. However, in the present context, there is an immediate worry about 
this explanation. While there is more than one reason to be interested in the distinction 
between the right and the wrong kind of reasons, the WKR defenders we are concerned with 
here make this distinction, at least in part, to solve the WKR problem for FA accounts.30 But 
value-based theories of reasons seem to be in clear tension with FA accounts. It looks circular 
to hold both that the valuable is what there is reason to value, and that reasons to value are to 
be understood in terms of what is valuable. 
                                                
30 WKR defenders who do not wish to defend FA accounts do not face the worry I go on to discuss. This is an 
important restriction on the scope of my argument.  
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 However, there is a way for WKR defenders to break out of this circle. Proponents of 
FA accounts must certainly deny that all reasons are to be understood in terms of values. But 
the Value-Based theory is an account of only the wrong kind of reasons. So long as there is 
an independent and non-value-based account of the right kind of reasons, WKR defenders 
can thus accept the Value-Based Theory and an FA account, and so explain the Wrong 
Reason Pattern. 
 However, combining an FA account with the Value-Based theory leads us back to 
Reductionism. The Value-Based theory says that for p to be a wrong kind of reason for 
attitude A is for p to be a respect in which it is good to have attitude A. FA accounts will say 
that for p to be a respect in which a thing is good is for p to be a reason of the right kind to 
favour that thing. So given an FA account, the Value-Based theory is simply another way of 
stating the thesis of Reductionism: 
 
(Reductionism) For p to be a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A is for p to be a 
reason of the right kind to want attitude A. 
 
4.3. Reductionism 
 
We have now seen that both of the WKR defender’s strategies for explaining the Wrong 
Reason Pattern involve a commitment to Reductionism. To see whether these strategies are 
successful, we must thus consider the merits of this thesis. 
 The difference between Reductionism and WKR skepticism may seem slight. WKR 
skeptics hold that incentives for attitudes are reasons to want (and bring about) those 
attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes. Reductionists hold that incentives for attitudes 
are reasons for those attitudes, but that what it is for an incentive to be a reason for an attitude 
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is for it to be a reason of the right kind to want that attitude. So whereas WKR skeptics 
appeal to reasons to want attitudes to explain why we mistake incentives for attitudes for 
reasons for those attitudes, Reductionists appeal to such reasons to analyse the wrong kind of 
reasons. The central challenge for Reductionists is thus to show that the right kind of reasons 
to want an attitude also count as, or ‘add up to’, reasons for that attitude. To put it another 
way, Reductionists must show that their analysis entails that the wrong kind of reasons for an 
attitude really are reasons for that attitude. I shall argue that Reductionists face serious 
difficulties meeting this challenge. 
 We can start to see the problem by contrasting the Reductionist account of the wrong 
kind of reasons with the accounts of the right kind of reasons discussed above. Each of these 
accounts works by taking for granted the relation of being a reason for, and then pointing to a 
further mark or feature that distinguishes the right kind of reasons (e.g. that they are ‘object-
given’, or bear on correctness, or are shared by everyone engaged in a certain activity). In this 
way, the right kind of reasons are explained in the way it is natural to explain what it is to be 
an isosceles triangle, or a snub nose. We say what an isosceles triangle is by saying that it is a 
triangle with a certain feature – namely, that two of its sides are of the same length. And we 
say what a snub nose is by saying that it is a nose with a certain feature – namely, 
concavity.31 Similarly, the accounts we have considered say what a right kind of reason for an 
attitude is by saying that it is a reason for that attitude with a certain further feature. Thus we 
may say that each of these accounts offer a conjunctive analysis of the right kind of reasons. 
 Conjunctive analyses have important advantages. In particular, such analyses trivially 
meet the sort of challenge faced by Reductionism. It is a trivial consequence of the accounts 
above that the right kind of reasons for an attitude are reasons for that attitude, that isosceles 
triangles are triangles, and that snub noses are noses. 
                                                
31 I take the latter example from Anton Ford, who takes it from Aristotle. See ‘Action and Generality’, in Essays 
on Anscombe’s Intention, ed. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 76-104.  
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 Reductionism is not a conjunctive analysis of the wrong kind of reasons. It does not 
say that the wrong kind of reasons for an attitude are those reasons for that attitude which 
have a certain feature. And so it is not a trivial consequence of Reductionism that the wrong 
kind of reasons for an attitude are reasons for that attitude. Reductionists thus have further 
work to do to show that their account has this consequence. 
There are at least three ways in which Reductionists might try to meet this challenge. 
First, Reductionists might simply revise their account so that it becomes a conjunctive 
analysis. They might claim that for p to be a wrong kind of reason for attitude A is for p to be 
a reason for attitude A and a right kind of reason to want attitude A. However, if 
Reductionists revise their account in this way, their view no longer explains the Wrong 
Reason Pattern. To explain the Wrong Reason Pattern, Reductionists would now need to 
show that when there is the wrong kind of reason for attitude A, the fact that attitude B 
facilitates attitude A is both a reason for attitude B and a reason of the right kind to want 
attitude B. The Desire Pattern ensures the second of these conditions is met, but it does not 
guarantee that the first is. 
 Second, Reductionists might look for a non-trivial way of showing that the right kind 
of reasons to want an attitude are also reasons for that attitude. To see how this might work, 
note that there can be different levels of analysis.32 We can analyze isosceles triangles as 
triangles with two equal sides, but we can also say – going a bit deeper – that isosceles 
triangles are three-sided closed figures with two equal sides. While this latter analysis is 
intuitively deeper, it does not trivially entail that isosceles triangles are triangles. But when 
we add that triangles are three-sided closed figures, we can see that it entails it nonetheless. 
Similarly, it might be that when we combine Reductionism with a general account of what it 
                                                
32 See Jeffrey King, ‘What Is A Philosophical Analysis?’ Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 155-79, 167. 
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is to be a reason for an attitude, it will become clear that Reductionism does, after all, entail 
that the wrong kind of reasons for an attitude are reasons for that attitude. 
 It is difficult, however, to see how this might work. The suggestion is that 
Reductionism might implicitly include an analysis of what it is to be a reason for an attitude, 
just as the second, deeper, analysis of what it is to be an isosceles triangle implicitly includes 
an analysis of what it is to be a triangle. But there is nothing in Reductionism which looks as 
if it could play that role. The Reductionist’s analysis involves two constituent properties – 
that of being a reason to want an attitude, and whatever further property distinguishes the 
right kind of reasons. But on pain of circularity, we cannot say that what it is for something to 
be a reason for an attitude is for it to be a reason to want that attitude. And nor can the further 
property serve as such an analysis. This further property is precisely intended to pick out only 
the right kind of reasons – it cannot be the sort of thing which will characterize all reasons 
for attitudes. 
 Third, Reductionists might suggest that we take the right kind of reasons to be prior to 
reasons in general, and offer a disjunctive account of the latter in terms of the former. On 
such an account, what it is for p to be a reason for some response is for p to be either a right 
kind of reason for that response or a right kind of reason to desire that response. Such an 
account would trivially imply that the right kind of reasons to desire an attitude are reasons 
for that attitude. However, while this may be the most promising of the Reductionist’s 
options, it nonetheless faces at least two significant problems. First, since it requires us to 
give up the natural thought that the right kind of reasons should be given a conjunctive 
analysis, it is incompatible with at least some of the familiar accounts of the right kind of 
reasons discussed above, all of which are naturally formulated as conjunctive analyses.33 
Second, the suggestion faces a general worry about disjunctive analyses. If it turns out that 
                                                
33 Some of these accounts – such as the ‘Brentano-style’ account and D’Arms and Jacobson’s account – may be 
reformulable as non-conjunctive analyses. It is harder to see how to reformulate the object/state theory and 
Schroeder’s account as non-conjunctive analyses. 
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what it is for something to be F is for it to be either G or H, then it looks as if it has turned out 
that the Fs do not have anything distinctive in common – as it turned out that pieces of jade 
do not have anything distinctive in common.34 It is a cost of an account if it implies that a 
category of things which appear to have something distinctive in common – such as reasons – 
turn out not to do so.  
 It thus seems to me that none of the three ways by which Reductionists might try to 
show that the right kind of reasons to want an attitude are also reasons for that attitude is 
satisfactory. If this is so, WKR defenders should not accept Reductionism. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Both of the WKR defender’s strategies for explaining the Wrong Reason Pattern commit the 
WKR defender to Reductionism. But Reductionism, I have argued, should be rejected. WKR 
defenders are thus left without a satisfactory explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern. By 
contrast, WKR skeptics offer a straightforward explanation of why, if we mistake reasons to 
want and bring about an attitude for reasons for that attitude, we will also take the Wrong 
Reason Pattern to hold. I take this to be an important advantage of WKR skepticism, and an 
important problem for WKR defenders. However, my argument faces two questions. 
 First, like all arguments of this form, my argument is open to the charge that I have 
overlooked promising alternative strategies by which WKR defenders might try to explain 
the Wrong Reason Pattern. To this charge, there is nothing very definitive I can say. I do not 
know how to argue that WKR defenders have no promising options beyond the ones I have 
discussed. All I can say is that I cannot think of any. It is of course possible that someone will 
                                                
34 Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 69. 
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come up with a better alternative.35 
 Second, it might be wondered where my argument leaves us. Suppose that it is 
granted that WKR skepticism offer the best explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern. This 
would not show that WKR skepticism is true. Rather, it would provide one consideration in 
its favour But it may be, as several philosophers have recently argued, that there are also 
important considerations counting against WKR skepticism. If these philosophers are right, 
then perhaps we should reject WKR skepticism, its capacity to explain the Wrong Reason 
Pattern not withstanding. 
 I can say more about this concern. While several philosophers have offered objections 
to WKR skepticism, I do not think any of these objections succeed. By way of a coda, I shall 
argue that WKR skeptics can make entirely satisfactory responses to three central objections 
that have been raised against them. If these responses succeed, then it seems to me that the 
WKR skeptic’s straightforward explanation of the appearance of the Wrong Reason Pattern 
does tip the balance of considerations in favour of WKR skepticism.  
 Two points will be central to my case. First, we can often see how to respond to 
objections to WKR skepticism by considering why parallel objections do not arise for the 
view that incentives for headaches and perceptual experiences do not provide reasons for 
these things. Second, while WKR skeptics can allow that in many cases incentives for 
attitudes are reasons both to want and to bring about those attitudes, WKR skeptics should 
take the former to be primary. 
WKR skepticism is a kind of error-theory. It holds that people mistakenly think that 
incentives for attitudes are reasons for those attitudes because they confuse reasons for 
                                                
35 One possibility is to appeal to a desire-based theory of the wrong kind of reasons. Such a theory would hold 
that there is a wrong kind of reason for an attitude just when having that attitude facilitates something you 
desire. Since such views are structurally similar to value-based theories – both explain reasons for attitudes by 
pointing to something facilitated by attitudes – such views are of the right form to explain the Wrong Reason 
Pattern. However, desire-based theories of the wrong kind of reasons face many of the familiar problems faced 
by desire-based theories of reasons for action (see, e.g. Parfit, On What Matters, chaps. 3 and 4). For example, 
even if you do not care about being tortured, it seems like the demon’s threat gives you a reason to admire him.  
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attitudes with reasons to want or bring about an attitude. One way to argue against WKR 
skepticism is thus to argue that there are cases in which there is an incentive for an attitude 
but no reason to want or to bring about that attitude. I shall begin by considering several 
putative such cases. I shall argue that while there are several kinds of case in which 
incentives are not reasons to bring about the relevant attitudes, in all such cases there are still 
reasons to want to those attitudes. The moral of these examples is thus that WKR skeptics 
should take reasons to want attitudes as primary. 
First, there are cases in which there is simply nothing you can do to bring about the 
relevant attitude. If the prize is for believing, right now, that the Moon is made of green 
cheese, then unless you happen to have on you a very fast working “belief pill”, you simply 
will not be able to do anything to bring about this belief. And so if we think that ‘reason’ 
implies ‘can’, you will not have any reason to bring about the belief that the Moon is made of 
green cheese. Nonetheless, you have a reason to want to believe that the Moon is made of 
green cheese. 
 Second, there are cases in which there is no need to bring about the relevant attitude. 
As Andrew Reisner observes, the incentive might be offered for a belief that you already 
hold, or for which you have been presented with conclusive evidence.36 In these cases, 
bringing about this belief is unnecessary and so not plausibly something you have reason to 
do. Nonetheless, you have a reason to want this belief. 
 Third, there are cases in which the incentive holds on the condition that you do not 
bring about the relevant attitude.37  This is the structure of Kavka’s original toxin puzzle – as 
Kavka describes things, the billionaire will reward you only so long as you intend to drink the 
toxin without having hired a hypnotist, or created extra incentives for drinking the toxin, or 
done any of the other things which might help to bring about this intention. In cases of this 
                                                
36 Reisner, ‘The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons’, 270-1. 
37 Reisner (ibid., 271) calls these cases of ‘blocked ascent’. 
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sort, incentives are not reasons to bring about the relevant attitudes. Nonetheless, they are 
reasons to want these attitudes. 
However, it might be thought that we can also describe cases in which incentives are 
not reasons to want the relevant attitudes. As Reisner points out, there is nothing to stop evil 
demons, or eccentric billionaires, offering incentives for attitudes which are conditional on 
your lacking the desire for that attitude.38 For instance, the evil demon might threaten to kill 
you unless you admire him without also wanting to admire him. Reisner claims that in cases 
of this sort, incentives are not reasons to want the relevant attitude. 
 It is not clear that this is right. The further conditions in these cases certainly give you 
an incentive not to desire the relevant attitudes. But that is compatible with there also being 
reasons to want these attitudes.39 So more needs to be said to defend the claim that the 
incentives in these cases are not reasons to want the relevant attitude. 
 There is more that can be said. If the incentives in these cases are reasons to want the 
relevant attitudes, they are reasons of a rather strange sort. For notice that if you form the 
desire to admire the demon in response to the demon’s threat, then the incentive for admiring 
the demon disappears – the demon will kill you anyway. So if the incentive for admiring the 
demon is a reason to want to admire the demon, it is a reason which cannot survive being 
responded to.  
 It is a matter of dispute whether there can be reasons of this sort. Many philosophers 
accept an “internalist” condition on reasons, according to which a consideration is a reason to 
A only if it is possible to A for that reason. This condition rules out reasons of the above sort. 
However, many other philosophers reject this condition, and hold that there can be reasons 
                                                
38 Ibid., 271. 
39 Richard Chappell has independently made this point. See http://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/12/who-has-
intuitions-about-whether-there.html. 
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which cannot be responded to.40 The above example shows that WKR skeptics are committed 
to joining this latter camp. 
 This may be thought to count against WKR skepticism. But in fact examples of this 
sort show that all proponents of FA accounts – WKR skeptics and defenders alike – are 
committed to accepting reasons of this sort. In the example imagined, it would clearly be 
good to admire the demon, since doing so would save your life. FA accounts are thus 
committed to thinking that there are reasons to want to admire the demon, even though 
responding to this reason would make it disappear. So the claim WKR skeptics need to make 
about Reisner’s example is one that FA accounts need to make anyway. 
A second objection to WKR skepticism claims that there is a tension between the two 
claims WKR skeptics make – that incentives are reasons to want and to bring about attitudes, 
but not reasons for those attitudes. Several philosophers worry that the latter, negative, claim 
undermines the former, positive, claim. Thus Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen write, ‘To 
be sure…we have reasons to want to have such attitudes and to try to have them, but this is 
only because we have reasons to have them, in the first place’.41 
 There are at least three ways to understand this objection. A first version starts with 
the premise that there is reason to want or bring about an attitude only if there is a reason for 
that attitude. It follows immediately from this premise that WKR skepticism is false. 
However, we should not accept this premise without argument. After all, the WKR skeptic’s 
central claim is precisely that there are cases – the WKR scenarios – in which there are 
reasons to want or bring about attitudes there is no reason for. To simply assert otherwise is 
to beg the question. 
                                                
40 See Elijah Millgram, ‘Williams’ Argument Against External Reasons’, Nous 12 (1996): 345-64; Schroeder, 
Slaves of the Passions, 165-7; and Julia Markovits, ‘Internalism and the Motivating Intuition’, in New Waves in 
Metaethics, ed. Michael Brady (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) (and see references therein). 
41 ‘The Strike of the Demon’, 413. Cf. Olson, ‘Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons’, 297, Louise, 
‘Correct Responses’, 350, Markovits, ‘Internalism and the Motivating Intuition’, 155. 
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 A second version of the objection aims to defend the crucial premise by appealing to a 
generalization of it – that there is reason to want or bring it about that you F only if there is 
reason for you to F. However, this generalization is certainly false. Suppose, for instance, that 
you are offered a large prize for having a headache, or an experience of redness. You would 
then have reason to want or to bring about a headache or an experience of redness, although 
there are no reasons for headaches or experiences of redness. Not everything there is reason 
to want is something that there is reason for. 
 A third version of the objection is more promising. Reisner suggests that WKR 
defenders can offer a straightforward explanation of the reasons to bring about attitudes for 
which there is an incentive, which is not available to WKR skeptics.42 The explanation 
appeals to the transmission of reasons across facilitative connections. Reisner’s thought is 
that WKR defenders can say that there is reason to bring about such an attitude because 
bringing about such an attitude is a means to having an attitude which there is reason for. 
However, this explanation requires there to be reasons for such attitudes, and so is not 
available to WKR skeptics.43  
 Reisner is right that WKR skeptics cannot explain reasons to bring about these 
attitudes in this way. But an equally plausible explanation is available to them. For as a first 
pass, it is highly plausible that there is reason to bring about states that there is reason to 
want. Something along these lines is needed to explain, for instance, why there can be 
reasons to bring about headaches and perceptual experiences, among other things there can 
be reason to want, but which are not themselves subject to reasons. And this principle can 
equally explain why there are reasons to bring about attitudes for which there are 
                                                
42 Reisner, ‘The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons’, 269-70. 
43 There is room to challenge the transmission pattern which Reisner relies on here. Reisner’s pattern requires 
there to be reasons to do things that facilitate attitudes there is reason to have. I think the arguments against the 
Mixed Pattern in section two also count against this pattern. Nonetheless, I will grant Reisner’s pattern for 
present purposes. 
 34 
incentives.44 So this version of the objection also fails to show that the WKR skeptic’s 
negative claim undermines the positive claim. 
 There is a final objection to WKR skepticism to consider. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen end their discussion of WKR skepticism by claiming that WKR skeptics have no 
real advantage over WKR defenders, with respect to the WKR problem. This is because 
WKR skeptics will still ‘need to clarify, without taking the notion of value for granted, what 
makes something a reason for wanting (or trying) to have a certain attitude toward an object 
rather than a direct reason for having the attitude in question’. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen suggest that this project will in effect require a further solution to the WKR 
problem.45 
 This objection can be understood in two ways. In saying that WKR skeptics must say 
‘what makes something a reason’, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen could either be 
asking for an analysis of what it is to be a reason to want, or they could be asking for a 
substantive account of the conditions under which there are reasons to want. 
 However, WKR skeptics should accept neither of these demands. As is often pointed 
out, it is a virtue of FA accounts that they are neutral on the substantive question of what 
things are of value – e.g. between hedonism, desire-based theories, and the various objective-
list theories. However, it is clear that this neutrality requires FA accounts to be neutral on the 
substantive question of when exactly there are reasons to value. The only substantive claims 
WKR skeptics need to make are those that define the view – that incentives for attitudes are 
not reasons for those attitudes but are reasons to want, and in many cases bring about, those 
attitudes. These claims are compatible with a wide-range of substantive views of the 
conditions under which there is reason to want something. Nor need WKR skeptics accept a 
                                                
44 Of course, this response leaves reasons to want such attitudes unexplained. But the WKR defender has no 
advantage here. Both WKR skeptics and defenders can explain reasons to want these attitudes by appealing to 
the Desire Pattern. 
45 ‘The Strike of the Demon’, 413-4. Cf. Louise, ‘Correct Responses’, 350. 
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demand to provide an analysis of reasons to want. For it is equally a virtue of FA accounts 
that they are compatible with a wide-range of views of what it is for something to be a 
reason, as well as with the view that reasons are unanalyzable. And again a wide-range of 
such views are compatible with the WKR skeptic’s claims. 
 I conclude that none of the central objections to WKR skepticism in the recent 
literature show WKR skepticism to be implausible. So if the central arguments of the paper 
succeed, WKR skeptics really do have a significant advantage over WKR defenders.  
